Abstract: I study a market where agents with unit demand jointly own heterogeneous goods. In this market, the existence of an efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced mechanism depends on the shares of the agents. I characterize the set of shares for which having such a mechanism is possible. This set includes the symmetric allocation and excludes the allocation in which every agent owns a separate good. An implication of the results is that partnerships should be formed on equal shares ex ante to make it possible for future dissolution.
I use the same technique in this paper.
In an independent work, Gershkov and Schweinzer (2010) analyze a queueing problem where agents have the same value for a service provided with differing waiting costs. They show that if the access rights to the service is a random order, then the efficient trading is possible whereas a deterministic order makes it impossible. Although their problem is different, the intuition for their results and mine are similar. Segal and Whinston (2010) analyze a general model and show that if the equilibrium allocation has the same distribution as the status quo then individual rationality may be satisfied.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 states a necessary and sufficient condition to have a mechanism with the required properties.
Section 4 analyzes this condition for different initial shares. The last section summarizes the Consider a set of agents A = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and a set of goods G = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each agent i has a valuation vector θ i ∈ [v, v] n where θ ij is the value that agent i assigns to good j.
For any i, all θ ij s are drawn independently from a distribution F i with support [v, v] and continuous positive density f i . Moreover, for i = i , θ i is independent of θ i . Finally, each agent's valuation vector θ i is known privately and it is common knowledge that θ i is drawn
The goods are initially owned by the agents collectively. Let α i ∈ R n + be the vector of initial shares owned by agent i and α = (α 1 ; α 2 ; . . . ; α n ) be the matrix of shares which is commonly known by the agents. Every good is owned completely by the set of all agents, so α i = (1, 1, . . . , 1). Initially, every agent owns one good in total,
For some applications α ij can be interpreted as the probability of agent i retaining good j. Under this interpretation, every agent has a lottery ticket that entitles this agent to one good with a specific probability distribution.
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I assume that each agent's utility is linear in money and the assets. To be more specific, an agent with valuation vector θ i , shares s i , and money m i has utility θ i · s i + m i .
By the revelation principle, it is sufficient to consider direct revelation mechanisms (DRM) for analyzing the existence of a mechanism with the required properties. In a DRM p, t , all agents report their own types θ i to get p i (θ) share of the goods and a monetary
] be the expected shares that agent i is going to get from participation and T i (θ i ; α) = E θ −i [t i (θ; α)] be the expected transfers. Therefore, in 3 That means α is a bistochastic matrix -a square matrix with rows and columns adding up to one. Using the Birkhoff -Von Neumann theorem, this matrix can be written as a linear sum of bistochastic matrices whose entries are all zero or one. Therefore, this random allocation can indeed be implemented.
4 Given an allocation problem, α is a constant which is commonly known by all the agents. Even though agents do not announce α in the DRM, the payments can depend on it. To analyze the problem for different values of α, it is explicitly written in the transfer function. the interim stage when agent i only knows θ i their expected utility from participating in the
. If agent i misreports their type to be
A mechanism p, t implements allocation rule p if truth-telling is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Such a mechanism is called (interim) incentive compatible (IIC) and satisfies the following inequality:
A mechanism p, t which gives non-negative expected utility in the interim stage to all the agents is called (interim) individually rational (IIR):
this mechanism is called ex ante budget balanced if the sum of expected transfers is zero, that
for all allocation rules p and for all θ. In this case p is also called the efficient allocation rule. Note that efficiency is a condition on the allocation rule and pins it down generically. Moreover, for generic θ, the efficient allocation rule assigns one separate good to each agent. Furthermore, I need the following property of the efficient allocation rule.
Fact 1. Suppose that p is the efficient allocation rule. Then p i (θ) = p i (θ + c) where c ∈ R for all i and almost all θ.
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This fact follows directly from the definition. If
Since I concentrate on efficient mechanisms, the only choice variable the transfer function.
In this section I provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a mechanism to satisfy the properties listed. First by a revenue equivalence theorem any two EF and IIC mechanisms are interim payoff equivalent up to a constant. Therefore, to analyze the existence of such a mechanism which also satisfies EABB and IIR, it is sufficient to use a generalized VCG mechanism which is EF and IIC. Hence, I derive a necessary and sufficient condition to have an EF, IIC, IIR, and EABB condition which is also implementable in dominant-strategies since VCG mechanisms make it a dominant strategy for agents to report their types truthfully. By using the transformation in Arrow (1979) and d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) (Arrow-AGV transformation) BB can be used instead of EABB which preserves the other properties except the dominant-strategy implementation.
Some Preliminary Results
To begin, I give the revenue equivalence condition for the setup.
Fact 2. Any mechanism which is EF and IIC satisfies the following:
Note that the integral given in the theorem is a line integral. However, because the domain of valuations is simply connected and the mechanism is IIC, the integral is independent of the choice of the path, except the starting and the ending points which appear in the integral.
Revenue equivalence conditions like that in Fact 2 have been used in the market design literature extensively. This fact is a special case of the envelope theorems of Krishna and
Maenner (2001) and Milgrom and Segal (2002) .
By the revenue equivalence condition, two incentive compatible and efficient mechanisms are payoff equivalent up to a constant. Consequently, in the interim stage, for every agent i with initial shares α i the worst possible typeθ i (α i ) can be defined without specifying any particular mechanism. More formally,
It is not clear a priori that such types exist. We prove that they exist and provide their properties in Subsection 3.3. We postpone this to get to the characterization result without further delay.
Using this definition I state a necessary and sufficient condition for a mechanism to be EF, IIC, BB, and IIR. I do not give a proof of this theorem as the proof is similar to the proofs of Theorem 1 in Fieseler, Kittsteiner, and Moldovanu (2003) and Theorem 3 in Williams (1999).
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Fact 3. An EF, IIR, IIC, and BB mechanism exists if and only if, for any IC and EF mechanism p, t the following holds:
In words, efficient dissolution is possible if and only if the worst-off types have enough utility such that extracting it will suffice to balance the budget.
VCG Mechanism
Since it is enough to check inequality 1 for any EF and IIC mechanism, I can work with a VCG mechanism.
To define a VCG mechanism, only the transfer rule needs to be specified, as the allocation rule is determined by the efficiency condition. In the case of ties a random tie-breaking rule can be used. Let
be the transfer function of agent i depending on both θ and α.
Let SS(θ; α) = θ i · (p i (θ) − α i ) be the social surplus created at the realization θ. Now,
The proof is essentially two steps. In the first step, it is shown that this condition is necessary and sufficient to have an EF, IIC, EABB, and IIR mechanism. In the second step, an Arrow-AGV transformation is used to prove that the same condition is still sufficient to make the mechanism BB. SS(θ; α). Therefore, each agent receives the social surplus ex post. Similarly, write the interim utilities of agents as
Using this mechanism Fact 3 can be rewritten as follows: Theorem 1. An EF, IIC, IIR, and BB mechanism exists if and only if
(2)
Proof. Rewrite inequality 1 using the VCG mechanism. The left hand side of the inequality is obvious as
For the right hand side notice that
; α] includes the expected social surplus except the i-th term in the social surplus.
Therefore, when the sum is taken over all agents it becomes n − 1 times of all the expected social surplus which gives the desired inequality.
Worst-off Types
By Theorem 1, one only needs to check inequality 2 for the existence of a mechanism with the listed properties. However, to do this a characterization of the worst-off types is needed.
This subsection addresses issues related to the worst-off types and gives an equation which essentially characterizes them.
I start with a technical lemma.
Moreover, if both θ i andθ i satisfy the equation then θ i =θ i + c where c ∈ R.
Proof. Fact 1 implies that P i (θ i ) = P i (θ i + c). Therefore, the domain of P i can be restricted to the union of the surfaces v, v] n−j where the value for good j is restricted to be v. I show that P i is one-to-one and onto under this domain.
This concludes that inequality 2 fails.
The intuition for this result is that since an agent owns one particular good, she expects to be a seller of this good on average. Therefore, overstating the value for the good may benefit her.
Theorem 2. The set of initial shares α for which there exists an EF, IIC, IIR, and BB mechanism is a non-empty and convex set.
Proof. Non-emptiness is shown in Proposition 1. Hence convexity remains to be proven.
Let α and α be two ownership vectors for which there exist two mechanisms satisfying the required properties which is equivalent to stating inequality 2. I need to show that the same inequality holds for β ≡ aα + (1 − a)α for every a ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the right hand side of the inequality is independent of α since the expectation is over θ. Therefore it is sufficient to show that
Let us write the incentive compatibility condition of agent i with typeθ i (β i ) for typẽ
Now, let us consider the incentive compatibility condition for typeθ i (α i ):
Multiply inequality 3 by a and inequality 4 by 1 − a and add them up to get:
Note that
Let us now rewrite the right hand side of inequality 5.
Which leads to the conclusion that U i (θ i (α i ); α) is a concave function of α by inequality 5.
Thus, the set of initial shares α for which the partnership can be dissolved efficiently is a convex set centered around the symmetric allocation and excluding the corners which assign all agents a separate good.
Conclusion
This paper studied whether an EF, IIC, IIR, and BB mechanism exists in a market with jointly owned heterogenous goods. Agents trade subject to the constraint that each one ends up with one good. By a revenue equivalence condition a (generalized) VCG mechanism can be analyzed without losing any generality. Then a necessary and sufficient condition was given to have a mechanism with the required properties. Using this condition it was shown that the set of initial shares for which it is possible to have such a mechanism is a non-empty and convex set.
The condition about the initial and final shares that each agent owns one good is restrictive. Possible future research could relax this condition by allowing agents to own any shares initially and finally. However, one needs to be careful because if the linear utility assumption is kept then this multi-partnership could be dissolved good by good using the mechanism in Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer (1987) .
Another direction for future research could allow interdependent valuations for the goods.
This could arise naturally in situations where agents have private information over some of the goods which also affect the valuations of the other agents.
